Cyber Resiliency in Naval Engineering Systems

GOAL: Maintain the operability of U.S. Coast Guard ships during cyber attacks



Cybersecurity at



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1. Need for Cyber Resiliency


3. Methodology

Systems Approach

- 1) Conduct stakeholder interviews
- 2) Create utility functions
- 3) Compare resiliency & security procedures
 - 1) MITRE's Structured Cyber Resiliency Analysis Methodology (SCRAM)
 - 2) DHS Cyber Resiliency Working Group (CRWG)
- 4) Identify gaps
- 5) Measure & Model Risk
- 6) Measure & Model Resiliency

4. Holistic View of Cyber/Naval System

Understand the perspectives of cyber security & resiliency experts, ship acquisition teams, and naval engineers involved at multiple levels of system integration. Perspectives shape the lens of which the system is viewed.



5. Current Insights & Future Research

- The interactions within the Naval Engineering & Cyber Resiliency system suggest an opportunity for improved resiliency
- These interactions should be investigated to improve shipboard engineering systems that now have a cyber component to prevent unintentional downtime

Cyber resilience acknowledges that risk can not be mitigated to reduce vulnerabilities to 0 and therefore needed to maintain the ability to perform

Risk Mitigation + Resiliency = Performance Homeostasis

Where: Performance = 1

Resiliency Needed = 1 – Risk Mitigation

Equation 1

2. Define Cyber Resiliency & Metrics

<u>Naval System Cyber Resiliency:</u> Maximizing a ship's engineering system performance during a cyber incident to ensure the minimum operating level of a vessel is maintained.

Hypothesis: Cyber resiliency is not at a resting state and is in constant flux as new vulnerabilities and threats are continuously created by adversaries.

<u>"Information System Resilience:</u> The ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack." (NIST pub.800-30)

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Figure 1: System Boundary & Interactions (Red dash line indicates current understanding of possible improvements.)